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By ALISON LEIGH COW N
, In their view, they were unwitting
victims of a client s desperate
scheme to doctor the books and keep
the business afloat. But to the Securi¬
ties and Exchange Commission, they
were willing accomplices who valued
their six-figure fees more than their
duty to keep the client s shareholders
and potential investors informed.
In this instance, they are the three
Price Waterhouse auditors who certi¬
fied the books of AM International, a
maker of duplicating equipment and
other office products, several years
before the company went bankrupt in
1982.
The Government wrapped up its
case against Price and the three audi¬
tors yesterday in Federal District
Court in Manhattan, but Judge John
E. Sprizzo, who has appeared unsym¬
pathetic to the S.E.C.’s case, is not
likely to hear the closing arguments
in the case until this fall.
Reluctant Judges
Judges are often reluctant to sec¬
ond-guess accounting firms on com¬
plex issues, especially in situations
where expert witnesses themselves
disagree.
Yet just two weeks ago, an adminis¬
trative law judge for the S.E.C., in a
c se brought in 1985, imposed sanc¬
tions on another firm, Ernst & Whin-
ney, for failing to uncover wrongdo¬
ing at the U.S. Surgical Corporation.
The judge temporarily suspended the
firm, no  part of Ernst. & Young,
from accepting any new audits in the
New York region and censured the
partner in charge of the office that
did the audit.   .
In the Price case, the Government
is seeking a harsher punishment: a
wide-ranging court order against the
firm and the three individuals that
could subject them to harsh criminal
penalties if they  ere found guilty of
What Auditors Can Do
The case has been watched closely
by the accounting profession because
it involves one of the six largest ac¬
counting firms in the country and be¬
cause the Government is seeking one
of the harshest ¦ punishments ever
against an accounting firm. It also
captures in a nutshell the differences
between accountants and the invest¬
ors who rely upon them about what
: independent auditors can reasonably
accomplish.
¦ The Government’s complaint,
which was filed in 1985 and accuses
the three auditors, two of them part¬
ners, of allowing AM to resort to
nearly every type of accounting gim¬
mick imaginable to inflate income  
such as booking revenue on merchan¬
dise that customers had no obligation
to buy.
It also contends that the auditors
en aged in a cover-up by falsifying
their work papers after a new man¬
agement team took over at AM in
1981 and began questioning Price’s
work. Ultimately, the new team at
AM, on the advice of another account¬
ng firm, Arthur Andersen, took a
$203  illion charge against earnings
for accounting adjustments, much of
which Andersen believed would have
been more appropriately recorded in
the years before.
future violations of Federal securities
laws.
More cases like this can be expect¬
ed, as the S.E.C. has toughened its
stance on accounting and auditing
issues this year. In recent months, the
commission has set up a special unit
with five lawyers to sue advisers to
public companies, mostly lawyers
and accountants, whom it views as
guilty of  unethical or improper pro¬
fessional conduct.  Proceedings
brought on these charges are being
ade available to the public for the
first time, too.
The commission hopes to curb what
it  contends is a growing temptation
by accountants to bend professional
standards in a highly competitive
time in which audits have become a
managers settled related charges
with the S.E.C. (AM International,
whose stock trades on the Big Board,
emerged from bankruptcy in 1984.)
No Better Group 
Joseph E. Connor, the former
chairman of Price Waterhouse, has
testified that  there i  no better
group of auditors that this firm has
ever had  than the three on trial,
Daniel Jerbasi, Benjamin Perks and
Michael LeRoy, who all saw their re¬
sponsibilities increase after the AM
bankruptcy.
To prove its case, the Government
has marshaled evidence that the de¬
fendants knew of certain accounting
irregularities in the client’s fiscal
year 1980 books and ignored them
even though their colleagues at Price
and some AM executives had ques¬
tioned the practices.
1 For instance, the company adopted
a policy in 1979 of booking revenue on
* merchandise that had been shipped to
customers on a no-obligation, 90-day
trial basis. Price Waterhouse main¬
tains that a reserve set up by the
company for returned merchandise
was a sufficient response.
Sales Were Switched
The company was also accused of
doctoring its performance on one oc¬
casion by switching $1.9 million in
sales from the third quarter of the fis¬
cal year 1980 to the fourth quarter,
presumably to improve the quarterly
comparisons. Price’s Chicago office
had identified the bookkeeping entry,
as a problem in a memo it sent to Mr.
Jerbasi, who had final say over the
audit. Chicago was ultimately one of
seven Price offices that expressed
The S EoC  says
Price ¥  aterho se
valued its fee more
than its  uty.
commodity, the number of custom¬
ers have been whittled by the merg¬
ers of the late 1980’s, and accounting
firms feel they cannot afford to lose
clients.
For its part, Price Waterhouse has
fought the Government’s allegations
for half a decade   long after AM and
five of seven member  of its former
reservations in internal reports about
AM units that they had been asked to
S The company in 1980 altered its fis¬
cal year for AM’s foreign subsidi¬
aries from June 30 to July 31. creat¬
ing a one-time, phantom month. Ihe
Government contends that because
the month’s results were not sup¬
posed to show up on the company s in¬
come statement, _ AM managers
du ped expenses into the phantom
month and diverted revenues into the
adjoining fiscal years, ringing up a
$10.9 million loss for the month. Mr.
Jerbasi acknowledged in   memo to
AM’s management that  the large
loss may raise questions  about fis¬
cal year 1980 results, but he did not
reopen the 1980 audit, as the Gover ¬
ment contends would have been
proper.
Unreported Chan es
The Government also charges that
the company adopted, with its audi¬
tors  blessing, three undisclosed ac¬
counting changes that affected re¬
ported income favorably. Price
Waterhouse has argued that the two
of them were immaterial and that the
third was a  refinement of current
policy  not a change and thus did not.
have to be disclosed.
Arthur Andersen, which eventually
replaced Price Waterhouse as AM s
auditor, concluded in a special inves¬
tigation conducted in 1981 that the
company had understated its ex¬
penses in prior years by at least $41.
"'internal Price Waterhouse memos,
which the Government has
duced into evidence, suggest wh  the
firm might have signed off on  rac
tices that in hindsight  asked the
company’s troubles. In memos
other partners, Mr Jerbasl
plained that the firm had negotiate  a
very competitive three-year contr<  
ith AM and thus was not makm0 au,
uch money as it had expected on t i-
a dit He sai  he would seek to ha/e
the firm reappointed ®e
year to recoup the firm s lost fees.
